Abstract: Climate change is increasing the frequency of extreme weather events, with low-income countries being disproportionately impacted. However, these countries often face market frictions that hinder their ability to adopt effective adaptation strategies. In this paper, I explore the role of credit market failures in limiting adaptation. To achieve this, I collaborate with a large micro-finance institution and offer a randomly selected group of farmers access to guaranteed credit through an Emergency Loan following a negative climate shock. I document three key results. First, farmers who have access to the emergency loan make less costly adaptation choices and are less severely affected when a flood occurs. Secondly, I find no evidence of adverse spillover effects on households that did not receive the Emergency Loan. Finally, I demonstrate that providing the Emergency Loan is profitable for the micro-finance institution, making it a viable tool for the private sector to employ in similar circumstances.
Econometrica (2024), 92(2)
(with Erin Kelley and David Schönholzer)
Abstract: This paper examines whether moral hazard is a meaningful barrier to firm productivity and growth in low-income countries. We introduce monitoring devices into commuter minibuses in Kenya and randomize which minibus owners have access to the data using a novel mobile app. We find that treated vehicle owners modify the terms of the contract to induce higher effort and lower risk-taking from their drivers, resulting in lower firm costs, higher firm productivity, and firm expansion. These results suggest that moral hazard constrains firm productivity, and the proliferation of monitoring technologies could represent a boon for small firms in low-income countries.
American Economic Review (2024), 114(10)
(with Erin Kelley, Matthew Pecenco, and Edward Rubin)
Abstract: Many workers are evaluated on their ability to engage with customers. We measure the impact of gender-based customer discrimination on the productivity of online sales agents in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using a novel framework that randomly varies the gender of names presented to customers without changing worker behavior, we find the assignment of a female-sounding name leads to 50 percent fewer purchases. Customers also lag in responding, are less expressive, and avoid discussing purchases. We show similar results for customers around the world and across workers. Removing customer bias, we find women would be more productive than their male co-workers.
Forthcoming Journal of Labor Economics
(with Fiona Burlig, Amir Jina, Erin Kelley, and Harshil Sahai)
Abstract: Climate change increases weather variability, preventing farmers from tailoring investments to the upcoming monsoon. In theory, accurate, seasonal forecasts overcome this challenge. We experimentally evaluate monsoon onset forecasts in India, randomizing 250 villages into control, forecast, and benchmark insurance groups. Forecast farmers update their beliefs and behavior: receiving “good news” relative to a farmer’s prior increases cultivation, farm inputs, farm profits (for those unaffected by flooding) and reduces business; receiving “bad news” reduces cultivated land and farm profits but increases business. Overall, forecasts raise a welfare index by 0.06 SD. Unlike insurance, forecasts reduce climate risk by enabling tailoring.
Pre-analysis plan accepted via pre-results review at Journal
of Development Economics
(with Gaurav Chiplunkar and Erin Kelley)
Abstract: We use a randomized control trial to study how
young job-seekers share informa- tion about jobs within their social
network, and its implications for firms. When competition for a job is
made salient, we find that job-seekers are: (i) less likely to share
information about the job with their peers; and (ii) choose to share it
with fewer higher ability peers. This lowers the size and quality of the
applicants a firm sees and the hires they make. These results suggest
that firms who rely heavily on social networks to disseminate
information about jobs may see lower quality applicants than they
expected for positions that are deemed more competitive.
(with Erin Kelley and David Schoenholzer)
Abstract Road traffic accidents in poorly regulated public transit is a leading cause of death in low- and middle-income countries. We study how providing information about bus safety to passengers affects the demand and supply of safer public transit. We collect high-frequency measures of safe driving for five firms operating on one of the busiest long-range routes in Kenya, using a newly developed tracking device. We randomize private information to passengers about which firm is the safest choice. We then provide a public signal to both passengers and firms that buses are now being tracked. Treated passengers do not respond to private information at first, but after the introduction of the public signal they substitute strongly towards the safe firm, and some firms provide safer services. We rationalize these effects in a model of heterogeneous firms responding strategically to higher demand for safety due to the public signal. We derive welfare estimates of alternative equilibria, which imply that the welfare effects of information interventions crucially depend on the nature of the market equilibrium.
Home: Experimental Evidence on Repatriation Preferences of Refugees (with Erin Kelley and Reshmaan Hussam)
Flight Risk or Reward? Returns to Credit Between Refugees and Locals (with Erin Kelley and Reshmaan Hussam)
The Household at Work: A Field Experiment in the Rohingya Refugee Camps (with Erin Kelley and Reshmaan Hussam)
Online Marketplaces and Reducing Barriers for Small Firms (with Erin Kelley, Matthew Pecenco)
(with Gaurav Chiplunkar and Erin Kelley)
Abstract: We rely on real-time data from India’s second
largest job portal to study how COVID-19 (and the associated lockdown
measures) impacted the Indian labor market. Detailed firm-level vacancy
postings on location, industries, occupations and job characteristics
allow us to document three facts that suggest a dramatic contraction in
hiring, especially for young, less-educated and female job-seekers.
First, we observe a substantial decline in the total number of new
vacancies posted and the number of firms that post at least one job.
Second, we see an increase in jobs that can be completed from home and
fewer jobs in occupations that can be easily automated. Finally, we find
evidence that certain job-seekers are more affected than others, as
employers post fewer entry-level jobs, require higher levels of
experience and education, and advertise fewer jobs in female-dominated
occupations.